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Festschrift for Jam es Crotty
THE CURRENT MACROECONOMIC CRISIS
BILL GIBSON
Abstract. Professor Crotty once casually observed that in his view economics
could not be properly thought of as a science. This paper investigates the
implications of this view in light of the question of how the scientic method
has recently contributed to the evolution of economic practice. It is argue
that agent-based models might provide a platform for an integration of recent
micro and macroeconomic theories.
1. Introduction
Professor Crotty once casually remarked that economics, especially macroeconomics,
is not a science in the proper sense of the term, more akin to political philosophy
than an empirical discipline. Since the 1970s, this has indeed been the position
of the mainstream, at least with respect to Keynesian macroeconomics. The lat-
ter lacks realistic microfoundations, according to the orthodoxy, and is generally
inconsistent with the Walrasian system. This essay argues that the problem lies
deeper than the absence of a choice theoretic framework in the Keynesian model.
The main problem with macroeconomics of any theoretical avor is aggregation and
because macroeconomics aggregates ex ante it arrives an indefensible position of
using aggregates as policy instruments. Aggregation is an intractable problem and
is at the root of controversies that run from Marxian value theory to the capital
controversy to the negative result of Sonnenschein, Mantel and Debreu (SMD), that
no coherent microfoundations for aggregate economics exists.
There have been various responses to the inability to unify macro and micro
theories. The rise of clear identicationmethods in econometrics is an e¤ort to
restore scientic credibility to economics. Many of the traditional problems central
to the discipline, however, were abandoned as the literature focused on cute and
clevermicroeconomics.
It is argued here that it is possible that macroeconomics can be rescued by way
of agent-based models. These models require no ex ante aggregation and provide
a platform for policy intervention since the representative agent is no longer
required. Outcomes can be then be measured by aggregating the heterogenous in-
dividuals ex post. Familiar macroeconomic characteristics arise from these complex
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systems as emergent properties. What is sacriced as we turn to computer simula-
tions is the elegant formal mathematical analysis that characterized the Walrasian
system of the past.
The essay is organized as follows: section 2 reviews the problems of Keynesian
economics and the reaction of heterodox economists and asks why the project of the
unication of micro and macro has largely been abandoned. Section 3 suggests that
agent-based models may be a way to recover realistic microfoundations for macro-
economics. Section 4 concludes with some comments on nature of big problems in
economics and science generally.
2. The Crisis of Keynesian Economics
On a recent trip to the UK, a passport inspector noted that I had listed my profes-
sion as Professor of Economics. Hum...he said, as he regarded me with the mix of
curiosity and suspicion required of his post. Economics, that is...like...Keynesian
economics, right? I nodded a¢ rmatively and after a pregnant pause he asked
What is Keynesian economics.
The innocence of his question set me thinking: here is a public o¢ cial, in the
land of Keynes and where the Keynesian edice was constructed, and yet he does
not even know what it is. Is this just some form of rational ignorance? A second
darker hypothesis is that what we do as economists has little street value,nothing
of worth in a social context. Science generally does have street value, both private
and public, as is made clear every day in the press. Breakthroughs are regularly
reported in publications such as the New England Journal of Medicine, Science,
Nature, along with a host of television programs.
Certainly at one stage of the not too distant past economics, and especially
macroeconomics, possessed a good deal of street value. The golden age of macro-
economics, in the1960s, was based on the widely accepted notion that the econ-
omy was a complex machine that would occasionally get out of sorts with itself
and require some adjustment. Government relied on macroeconomists for advice
through the Council of Economic Advisors. Most large corporations, and virtually
all banks, had large and expensive econometric forecasting teams. Microeconomics
was a sideshow with its cost curves, discounting formulas and welfare triangles.
Keynesian theory had enjoyed almost complete hegemony, even among the most
conservative members of the profession. By the late 1980s, however, micro had
staged a dramatic comeback and macroeconomics was almost entirely displaced
from graduate curricula across the country. Part of the reason was an inconsis-
tency in advanced general equilibrium theory noticed by Debreu and others.1 Ex-
cept under restrictive conditions, the aggregate excess demand function need not
be downward sloping; it could take on any shape whatsoever. The long sought
after link between micro and macroeconomics seemed to be permanently out of
reach. Some writers, James Crotty among them, barely acknowledged the rift and
continued to assert the primacy of macro over micro for a variety of reasons. But
for the bulk of the profession, the unication of macro and microeconomics had
been mortally wounded by SMD.
At the policy level, it was the stagation of the 1970s that reduced to rubble the
simple Keynesian program of if there is ination, run a surplus and when there is
1See Debreu (1974). For an interpretation of SMD theory, see Rizvi (1997) and Rizvi (1994).
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unemployment, run a decit.At the center of the controversy was the instability
of the Phillips curve
...the inationary bias on average of monetary and scal policy [in
the 1970s] should...have produced the lowest average unemploy-
ment rates for any decade since the 1940s. In fact, as we know,
they produced the highest unemployment since the 1930s. This
was economic failure on a grand scale.(Lucas and Sargent, 1978,
p 277)
As the Phillips curve dissolved into a shapeless scatter diagram, the street value
of macroeconomics and its associated macroeconometric models diminished. Lucas
identied a fundamental problem in the macroeconometric literature based on the
Keynesian structural model, that agents would alter their behavior in reaction
to changes in policy (Lucas, 1976). The structural parameters could change in
response to policy initiatives and if this were not part of the analysis, it would
become impossible to predict the e¤ects of policy. Only self-interest remained
invariant to policy change.
Moreover, models that assumed no theory whosoever, the vector-autoregression
models, seemed to do as well as those that traveled with heavy theoretical baggage.
As Diebold notes, the awed econometrics that Lucas criticized was taken in some
circles as an indictment of all econometrics.New York Times economic columnist
Peter Passell, in an article titled The Model Was Too Rough: Why Economic
Forecasting Became a Sideshow,wrote that
Americans held unrealistic expectations for forecasting in the 1960s
 as they did for so many other things in that optimistic age,
from space exploration to big government...New York Times, 1
Feb. 1996
Rather than predict the interest rates with sta¤ of the econometricians, rms hired
MBAs to hedge against its movements. Public policy, as Keynes himself predicted,
is still a few decades behind the curve and references to aggregate demand and
other Keynesian motifs can still be heard, whether at the Federal Reserve, Wall
Street or the Congressional Budget O¢ ce. Theoretical economics, however, has by
and large moved on, with the exception of heterodox economists.
2.1. The Heterodox Reaction. Here is a proposition (not necessarily due to
James Crotty): It could be that none of this talk of science, microfoundations and
the like is relevant. Indeed economics, and especially macroeconomics and macro-
economic policy, is just a tool of the rich used to bludgeon the poor into accepting
low wages. Economics is not a science and never was, but is rather auxiliary to
the broader project of class domination by the rich and powerful. The poor and
powerless are the victims of policy designed to shift resources and political power to
capital. Economists are implicated in this grand scheme of domination, a band of
self-referential (and self-refereeing) pseudo-scientists, who as a subsumed class take
a cut of the surplus for themselves. Their main task is thus ideological jawboning
rather than scientic. The political creed of the orthodoxy in economics is anti-
progressive, essentially libertarian on domestic issues and neoliberal internationally.
The scientic method is no more central to this project than it is to, say, religion
or a back-yard barbecue.
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Fine, but it isnt this proposition contradicted by the evolution of heterodox
economics? In the 1960s and 70s Marxian economics was a professionally viable
alternative to orthodox economics. As a result, some of the more broad-minded
neoclassical economists, Samuelson and Morishima for example, took up Marxian
themes. At the same time, radical economics began to insert itself in graduate pro-
grams around the United States and Europe, graduate programs that were training
young economists in the standard tools of scientic inquiry. It was in some ways
natural that cross- pollination would come about and in the late 1970s a number
nonneoclassical analysts produced work that bore the imprint of their training.
Sweezy, Baran and Emmanuel, and Samir Amin, gave way to Marglin, Bowles,
Gintis, Gordon, Roemer and others from both sides the Atlantic. Their work was
dened by four essential features: They (1) addressed the decidedly nonscientic
questions of income distribution, power, racism, sexism, imperialism and inequality
as opposed to the traditional e¢ ciency of resource allocation issues; (2) were un-
afraid of bourgeois tools of analysis, especially mathematics, data analysis and
econometrics; (3) were sensitive to the criticism of dogmatism in their analysis and
sought remove elements that could not be substantiated by logic or fact; (4) rejected
the relativism of emerging post-modernism in favor of methodological individualism
(at least to a considerable degree). These writers were above all eclectic, accept-
ing or rejecting hypotheses on their own terms as opposed to tradition. Although
they were unied by themes that had traditionally been of interest to Marxists,
the project as a whole was a denitive break from the traditional Marxism of the
preceding 150 years.
These analytical Marxists continued to dene themselves in opposition to the
orthodoxy, often unclear about their positive contributions, but very clear about
what they were not : neoclassicals. Ironically, much of neoclassical theory found
its way into their work, but piecemeal, one component at a time. Some used the
Walrasian system, others growth theory, monetary theory or computable general
equilibrium models and, especially, game theory. There was no part of neoclassical
theory that was completely o¤ limits and it is probably fair to say that all of it was
used one way or another at some point. James Crotty wrote some papers using
standard maximization models, but rejected various cornerstones of the traditional
thinking, such as the role competition plays in the e¢ cient allocation of resources.
Anti-neoclasscisim then owered into many theoretic directions, surveyed by
Colander (2003) and Gibson (2003). The term Marxist, for example, began to fall
out fashion, but more for substantive than stylistic reasons. The backdrop was an
explicit recognition of the possibility that the scientic method could illuminate the
incoherencies and irrationalities of the capitalist system. Many heterodox writers
accepted the view that the nature of the analytical tools employed is not constitutive
of the conclusions derived. Roemer and his associates expressed the proposition
most clearly: if exploitation was a fundamental fact of capitalist society, it should
be able to survive the transition to the Walrasian environment. That is, given
tastes, technology and the distribution of the endowment, exploitation was logically
entailed. This specialized project drew the attention of a specialized audience,
certainly, but it was as the same time widely respected.
Walrasian Marxism was subject to the same SMD criticism as the orthodoxy; in
short, no more macroeconomics was to come from Walrasian Marxism than from
the standard approach. Certainly this feature was of little concern for Roemer, who
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was primarily interested in the more basic issues of traditional Marxian economic
theory, such as exploitation and its relationship to social class. But from the general
perspective of microfoundations of macro, the work led to a dead end.
2.2. Declare Victory and Withdraw. Branching out from the work of the early
anti-neoclassicals was a wide range of heterodox approaches to problems of growth,
distribution, and trade and nance, powered by standard analytical methods of
comparative statics, dynamics, econometrics and game theory. Most of the macro-
models in the tradition of Dutt, Skott, Semmler, Taylor, Settereld and many others
had no specic microfoundations, but relied instead on a demonstrated correspon-
dence to the object of study, a particular economy at a particular time. Work
by Prof. Crottys students, viz. Jon Goldstein notwithstanding, most heterodox
economists were simply unconcerned with microfoundations (Dutt, 1993). Macro-
models were structural in nature and gave content to welfare propositions that
hinged essentially on the level of output, employment and ination.
The traditional problems of preference revelation and preference aggregation
were not ceded any space; there was no need to aggregate the utilities of the em-
ployed and unemployed since they were incommensurate. It follows that the welfare
of the system as a whole was not to be determined by an aggregate of the welfare of
individuals. Macropolicies that improved outcomes for the rich and the rich only,
even if there were no change in the well-being of the poor, were not necessarily
superior as they would be in standard analysis. Thus social welfare could not be
mediated exclusively by private welfare no matter how it was aggregated. The ag-
gregation problem, which dogged the traditional approach since its inception, was
solved by critical acclamation. In the process, the unication project was sacriced.
Naturally the balance of anti-neoclassical micro oriented economists took an
entirely opposite approach. For Bowles, Gintis, Skillman, Roemer and others at-
tracted to game theory it was literally impossible to forego maximizing models with
some conception of individual welfare at the core. Imagine, for example, a prisoners
dilemma in which the detainees were indi¤erent to their own freedom. When it
came down to micro foundations versus macroeconomics, they followed the ortho-
doxy in dismissing the latter. Bowles and Heinz (1996) for example, used industry
level data to show that raising wages in South Africa would cause a contraction in
employment despite the fact that progressive macroeconomists had compiled data
showing that the economy was stagnationistin Bhaduri and Marglins infelicitous
terminology (Bhaduri and Marglin, 1990),(Nattrass, 2000).
We could then forgive Prof. Crotty who in a reective mood concludes that
economics is more a political phenomenon than a science, social or otherwise. Key-
nesian theory seemed to be abandoned by the orthodoxy not necessarily because it
conicted with empirical observation, but because it was incomplete and at variance
with their libertarian, individualist biases. The heterodox a la carte approach never
produced a coherent alternative because it could not coalesce around a common the-
oretical framework. The debate seemed not to be about science and method, but
about competing philosophical positions.
Granted, heterodox economists might object that their work is scientic, solid,
empirically grounded, objective and replicatable. Heterodox articles are frequently
peer reviewed and this forces objectivity as it does elsewhere in the scientic com-
munity. There is certainly something to this argument. It might be possible to feign
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objectivity individually, but it is very di¢ cult for a crowd of skeptically minded in-
dividuals to do so, unless as Surowiecki notes, the wisdomof the crowd is highly
correlated (Surowiecki, 2004). But here Prof. Crotty might still be vindicated in
his view: Heterodox economics is not truly heterodox according to the ordinary
denition of the term, but rather the name of a broad coalition of anti-capitalist
researchers. Indeed, heterodoxy is far more homogeneous than the economics pro-
fession it opposes. There are no personally right-wing economists who are attracted
to the eld of heterodox economics for purely methodological, technical or other
professional reasons. The closely correlated attitudes of the heterodox clan under-
mines their objectivity in Surowieckis scheme.
Perhaps, then, macroeconomics is just a logical impossibility, like a failed state,
vulnerable to take-over by anti-scientic types. If so, then the options appear to be
limited. One can press on with the Keynesian model with its obvious deciencies.
Or one can decamp to something with more scientic content, as much of the
profession seems to be doing.
3. Smart Rats and Clean Identification
One of the greatest problems of aggregation is that one cannot often hold the com-
position of the aggregated variables constant. Were there a tight lattice structure
preventing slippage within society, then we could be more condent about policy
recommendations. Competition plays this role in economics but it cannot be relied
upon to hold structure entirely constant. But since structure tends to self-organize
in response to policy, it becomes ever more di¢ cult to distinguish correlation and
causality. This is, of course, an age-old problem and it pervades every branch of
science. Feynman in the classic Cargo-Cult Sciencedescribes the attempts of a
psychologist, identied only as Young, to hold variables constant in a experiment
with rats looking for food:
The question was, how did the rats know, because the corridor was
so beautifully built and so uniform, that this was the same door
as before? Obviously there was something about the door that
was di¤erent from the other doors. So he painted the doors very
carefully, arranging the textures on the faces of the doors exactly
the same. Still the rats could tell. Then he thought maybe the rats
were smelling the food, so he used chemicals to change the smell
after each run. Sill the rats could tell...He nally found that they
could tell by the way the oor sounded when they ran over it. And
he xed that by putting his corridors in sand. So he covered one
after another of all possible clues and nally was able to fool the
rats so they would go in the third door. If he relaxed any of his
conditions, the rats could tell. (Feynman, 1999, p 215)
Feynman goes on to claim that this is A-number-1 science because it reveals
the e¤orts one must undertake to hold everything constant. Macroeconomics also
seems to have had its smart rats.
In retrospect, it seems clear now that macroeconomics of the 1950s and 1960s was
held together by spurious correlation of macro variables driven by time. When time
was removed by way of cointegration techniques, much of the supposed causality
in macroeconomic theory evaporated. One reason macroeconomics enjoys so little
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street value now is that it has been so di¢ cult to rebuild it on a solid foundation
since. Micro has to some degree risen to the challenge.
Levitt and Dubner (2005) is perhaps the most visible evidence of the restora-
tion of the scientic method in economics, but this has been accompanied by an
invasion of social science by methods from chemistry, biology, geology and a wealth
of other disciplines. Diamond is perhaps the most well known architect of the in-
terdisciplinary approach, but there is also Hoxbys study of competition in schools
as demarcated by streams and rivers in urban environments (Diamond, 1997), (Di-
amond, 2005). More streams implied more schools and better learning outcomes
(Hoxby, 2000). Another well known example is Levitt and Donanhues claim that
the legalization of abortion after Roe v. Wade resulted in the lowered crime rates
in the 1990s (Donohue and Levitt, 2001). Their work challenged Lotts assertion
that shall carrylaws were responsible (Lott, 2000).
These last papers are all based on natural or quasi-experiments, di¤erential ap-
plications of policies in an arguably random way.2 Natural experiments are second
only to the gold standard of controlled experiments, such as the well known Star
study of the e¤ect of student teacher ratios on test scores (Mosteller, 1995). But
controlled experiments, like professional football, are often expensive and sometimes
dangerous and almost always imperfectly controlled.3 Still, clean identication is
an attempt to more closely adhere to Feynmans denition of A-number-1 science
in the e¤ort to distinguish correlation from causality.
The quasi-experimental approach, what Heckman has called the cute and the
clever,is an e¤ort to restore credibility to correlations attacked by skeptics (Scheiber,
2007). These studies range from Levitts Why Drug Dealers Dont Live with their
Mamas,to point shaving in basketball and sumo wrestling.4 The methods and data
sets used in some of these studies have already found their way into econometrics
textbooks and serve to educate future econometricians.
To the heterodox mind, this may just be additional evidence of the complete
sell-out of the orthodox establishment, hiding behind methodological renements
to avoid confronting more serious problems.5 Traditional economic issues such as
poverty, inequality, business cycles, global warming and environmental racism all
go unanalyzed for lack of proper instruments or experiments by which confounding
factors may be eliminated or controlled for. From this optic, there are too few,
not too many, interesting problems amenable to statistical analysis based natu-
rally randomizing treatment e¤ects a¤orded by quirks of nature or the whim of
policymakers.
Big issues, however, almost always arise as outcomes, or ex-post aggregates.
They result from something more fundamental at the ground level, behavior that
2For the counterargument see Helland and Tabarrok (2004).
3And, often unnecessary. See Smith and Pell (2003) for a satirical account of control group
methodology.
4See Levitt and Dubner (2005) and http://ideas.repec.org/e/ple59.html for a more complete
list of topics.
5Clean identication is not based on an assumed superiority of the rational model. Just as
often, its studies reveal that xed costs matter or that there is asymmetry of up- and down-side risk
or that individuals contribute to public goods, vote, or care about fairness when neoclassical theory
suggests that they should not. The rational model is interrogated on many levels, theoretical with
multiple-self congurations, experimentally and in numerical simulations of neurotransmission
mechanisms and in neuroscience experiments with live subjects.
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was not adequately captured in the aggregate models. Thus, even if they were
correct, the models would not lead to any clear policy implications because they do
not model the diversity of underlying agents. On the other hand, Levitts studies
of criminal behavior does at least show that criminals are partially rational and
will therefore likely respond to incentives to obey the law. Most macroeconomic
indicators, by contrast, are signals that some underlying behavior in the system
might be out of adjustment. What it is and how we are to get it back into sync
is remains unspecied by the model. This is why studies with clean identica-
tion are reviewed in scientic publications such as Nature, Science and Scientic
American while macro studies undertaken by heterodox economists never are. The
former have street value, clearly understandable methodologies and direct policy
implications.
There is one set of macro studies undertaken by heterodox economists that does
seem to draw a reaction from outside the heterodox community, agent-based or
multi-agent systems models.
4. Agent-Based Models
Bowles and Choi, for a recent example, published a study in Science using an agent-
based framework to study the coevolution of altruism and war (Choi and Bowles.,
2007). Agent-based models grew out of game theoretic simulations and papers
by Fehr, Basu, Axelrod and others have been regularly reviewed in the scientic
press.6 They hold out the promise of separating correlation and causality because
they allow experiments to be undertaken in silico, with literally everything else held
constant.7 They are also relatively inexpensive and safe, except for the occasional
lap-top re. The catch is convincing the scholarly community that the simulation
is realistic and appropriate to the problem.
Might it be possible, then, to have a macro-theoretical framework that relies
on individual self-interest, however imperfectly expressed, and at the same time
addresses bigger questions than the cute and clever micro literature? Let us rst
specify what we mean: agent-based models blend structure and agency in a way
that emphasizes the individual. This is not to say that structure does not mat-
ter, inasmuch as decisions made by agents in the past confront current agents as
ossied structure and is, therefore, ultimately endogenous. The macro features of
the model are not imposed, but rather arise out the micro specication as emergent
properties (Gatti et al., 2008). Following Jensen and Lesser for a general denition,
a multiagent system S, is composed of n agents A = fa1; a2; :::; ang and an envi-
ronment E: (Jensen and Lesser, 2002) Each agent is an object with methods that
cannot generally be invoked by other agents. Agents operate on state variables and
transform them according to the methods each agent employs. State variables are
passed to agents and serve to dene the spacial distribution of resources, informa-
tion about other agents and any additions or updates of the methods by which this
information is processed. The concept of an agent includes the standard notion of
consumer or producer as special cases, but is broader and more general.
Agents in multi-agent systems are best thought of as heterogeneous computa-
tional entities who make decisions based in an informationally constrained environ-
ment and with limited computational means (Wooldridge, 2002), (Sandholm and
6See for example Brock and Durlauf (2005), Durlaf and Young (2001) and Gatti et al. (2008).
7It is appropriate that in silico, here only simulates Latin and is not the real thing.
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Lesser, 1997). Agents may lack the resources to make the appropriate calculations
leading to an optimal allocation and/or may not have the time to complete calcula-
tions already begun if the environment E changes. Social pathologiesstudied in
the game theoretic literature, various prisoners dilemmas, suboptimal spending on
public goods and ultimatum irrationalities can easily arise in multi-agent systems
(Jensen and Lesser, 2002).
Schellings neighborhood model is an early example of a multi-agent system
(Schelling, 1971). White liberals following simple behavioral rules to generate en-
tirely segregated neighborhoods, despite preferences for more integrated ones. Each
agent is unaware of the true nature of its neighbors and only processes informa-
tion about skin color. Where white neighborhoods will be in the next round is
more di¢ cult for the agents to compute, however, and in the simplest version of
the model, agents move randomly, away from their current, undesirable location,
without thinking about where it will land. An agent might improve the chances
that it would not have to move a second time by way of a method that predicts the
moves of other white liberals.
Agents are then computational entities or objects and any personality that might
or might not evolve is itself an emergent property of these computations. In Gib-
son (2007), agents make only a decision whether to stay in their current job or
leave it and interesting macroeconomic properties arise. Initially technologies, or
blueprints, are randomly scattered around a grid. Both a unit of labor (an agent)
and a variable amount of nance are required in order to activate the technology
of a given cell. Finance is available from wealth accumulated by agents in the past
and is distributed back to cells according to protability with a random error term.
Prot is the di¤erence between wages and output and is redistributed to agents in
proportion to their wealth plus a random error term.
The key to the dynamics of the model is the wage bargain between agents and the
cells on which the agents reside. Cells can compute the marginal product of labor,
but agents lack su¢ cient information. Agents can compute their own reservation
wage, based on life-cycle variables as agents age, reproduce and die.
The decision variable is whether the agent is satised with her current job. Job
satisfaction depends mostly upon whether wealth is increasing or decreasing, but
there are also variables that derive from reinforcement learning models (Sutton and
Barto, 1998). Agents must learn what the grid as a whole has to o¤er in terms of
consumption possibilities. Unsuccessful agents become stuck in relatively low
wage jobs either because they do not have the accumulated wealth to nance a
move or they lack the education and skills required to take advantage of nearby
opportunities.
If agents move, they must then Nash bargain over the wage payment with the
new cell. In the Nash bargain, the surplus is dened as the di¤erence between the
marginal product of labor and the agents reservation wage. The outcome of the
bargaining process depends on relative impatience of the agent to the cell. Cells
are equally impatient in that they know that unless they are protable, they will be
unable to attract capital and will fall into disuse. Agents realize if they reject the
o¤ered wage they must move again, with all its associated costs and uncertainty. If
the agents reservation wage exceeds the marginal product, cells raise their prices,

















Figure 1. Income classes
In this simple model the economy grows with less than full employment on
a track that underutilizes the available technology. There is very little that is
optimal about this model in the tradition sense, but neither is it excessively prone
to mass unemployment nor spiraling ination. A skewed distribution of income
is an emergent property of this simple system. Figure 1 is drawn from Gibson
(2007). Even if the economy begins with an egalitarian wealth distribution, it
will deteriorate over time and eventually follow a power-law distribution of wealth.
Educated agents who secure good jobs early and keep them for a long time end up
wealthy. Those who move tend to run down their wealth but they may also succeed
in nding a better opportunity.
5. Conclusion
As the model of the previous section illustrates, the only way to avoid the prob-
lems of aggregation in macroeconomics is to start building the paradigm from the
bottom up. Macroeconomics must become an emergent property of the micro,
not a simple aggregation, but something surprising that was not obvious from in-
spection of the individual microeconomic elements. The microfoundations a¤orded
by the agent-based approach provides a link between previously disembodied macro-
economic framework of analysis and the underlying heterogeneous and boundedly
rational agents that populate the system. This framework can be calibrated em-
pirically to given historical specic economies to ask questions about how policies
might a¤ect individual and thus aggregated outcomes.
The return to the scientic foundations of research methodology seems to be
less about high theory than about better observations and in this regard, orthodox
economics is a very di¤erent opponent from what it was in the 1960s and 70s.
A common criticism of the orthodoxy in the past was over-application of over-
simplied theory. Have model will travel,intended to imply that Paladin had no
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concern for the broader implications. Now the reverse seems to be true: with cleaner
observations and more diverse, dare say heterodox theory, the scientic method is
showing its true worth, at least when applied to small well dened problems. The
challenge is to return to the bigger questions and this essay has provided some
suggestions for how that could be done.
The conict between big and little questions is hardly conned to the arena
of economics. There are many scientists who opposed the Superconducting Super
Collider which was projected to cost more than 12 billion dollars before it was
canceled by Congress in 1993.(Mervis and Seife, 2003) Just as many object to
the space program and in particular to the International Space Station (ISS) as a
colossal waste of money. The amount of real science that is accomplished on the
ISS is minimal and there has been heavy criticism of it since it crowds out smaller
projects.8 Certainly there can be no bigger issues than the sequencing of the human
genome, our place in the universe and our ability to colonize other worlds for good
or evil, but far more scientic activity is devoted to much smaller questions. Why?
Because the small questions are answerable and the big ones may or many not be;
and if they are, it will only be the result of the expenditure of vast sums of money,
time and possibly careers. Moreover, big questions may in themselves undermine
the scientic method in that results that necessarily involve massive expenditure
are ipso facto di¢ cult to replicate.
Macroeconomics may have in the past escaped the surly bounds of science in
order to pretend to answer the big questions. The rest of science, however, remains
very dismal. To take a well known example, string theory, an attempt in physics
to reconcile the macro of relativity and micro of quantum theory, has been less
than fully successful. An editorial in Scientic American recently referred to string
theory as recreational mathematical theologywhile Woit argues that it is Not
Even Wrong (Woit, 2006). Now that is failure on a grand scale.
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